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In a two-period model with uncertainty about life expectancy, we analyze several measures 
which are typically included in a social security reform: tax incentives for private life annuities, a 
cut in the social security benefits and an increase in the social security tax. First, we look at the 
demand side and study the effects on old-age provision for a given annuity price. It is shown 
that tax incentives for life annuities indeed stimulate annuity demand, when a partial-equilibrium 
approach is chosen, where a cut in the supply of public goods to finance the tax incentives does 
not influence the private consumption choice. In this case, they counteract the negative effects 
on old-age consumption of the other two reform instruments adopted to maintain long-run 
solvency of the social security system. However, when considering an increase in the income 
tax to finance the tax incentives, the positive effect on annuity demand is smaller and may even 
turn negative for some individuals. Second, we assess the effects of the reform measures on 
the equilibrium price, in view of an adverse-selection problem in the private annuity market. We 
find that a cut in the social security benefit rate reduces the adverse selection and consequently 
the equilibrium price, while an increase in the social security tax raises the equilibrium price. 
The effect of a tax incentive for life annuities is ambiguous and depends on the degree of risk 
aversion of the individuals. Adverse selection is mitigated, if the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion does not exceed a critical value, which is shown to be higher in case that the tax 
incentives are financed by a reduction in public goods compared to the case when they are 
financed by an increase in the income tax.  
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1. Introduction 
In many industrialised countries the social security systems, which are organised according to 
the pay-as-you-go method, are confronted with the ageing of the population, that is, with the 
increasing ratio of older to younger people, due to a decrease in fertility and to an increase in 
life expectancy. As a consequence, many countries around the world have recently undertaken 
a reform, are in the middle of the reform process or are debating reform options. In the first 
place, these reforms aim at changing parameters of the social security system in order to 
maintain long-run solvency of the system. The main policy instruments are an increase of the 
retirement age, in order to stabilise the dependency ratio, and a cut in the social security 
benefits. In addition or alternatively, there may be a need to increase the contribution rates.  
 
As a further element, many reforms include tax incentives for the purchase of private life 
annuities. For example, in Germany a state subsidy for the purchase of life annuities was 
introduced in 2002 and in Austria an even higher grant exists since 2000. The common 
argument of politicians for the stimulation of the demand for life annuities trough tax incentives 
is to prevent a so-called “gap in old-age provision” and old-age poverty, which might otherwise 
arise as a result of the planned reduction of the social security benefits.
1 This reasoning is in 
line with the merit-good argument that individuals are myopic, and by this, discount future 
consumption too much.  
 
In spite of the rapid increase in popularity, there have been no attempts so far to systematically 
analyse the economic implications of tax incentives for the purchase of life annuities. This study 
attempts to partially overcome this deficiency by addressing the issue, whether such tax 
incentives actually produce the desired effect of increasing self-provision for retirement. The 
answer is not that straightforward as it may appear at first glance due to the following two 
considerations: First, state subsidies are accompanied by opportunity costs, because somehow 
they have to be financed out of public budget which in turn may affect individual old-age 
provision negatively. Second, it is well known that the private market of life annuities fails to be 
efficient due to the phenomenon of adverse selection, which arises from asymmetric information 
and leads to poor demand for life annuities. As a result we may see little additional annuity 
demand due to tax incentives, because they may aggravate the adverse-selection problem. 
This paper addresses both issues and shows that they may indeed hamper the achievement of 
the reform objective to increase private old-age provision.  
 
                                                       
1  The second policy option to increase self-provision for retirement is mandatory annuitization, which was 
adopted e.g. in Switzerland and Australia for occupational pensions or is in discussion e.g. in the United 
States. For a discussion of mandatory retirement plans see e.g. Bateman et. al. (2001).    2
We formulate a two-period model, where provision for future consumption is guaranteed by a 
social security system, but individuals can make additional old-age provision voluntarily through 
private life annuities, and focus on a social security reform, which includes the following 
potential measures: a cut in social security benefits, an increase in the contribution rate and tax 
incentives for the purchase of life annuities. Two different methods to finance the tax incentives 
are considered: The government can either reduce spending for public goods or increase the 
income tax to keep public budget in balance. Due to the assumption that the reduction in public 
goods does not influence the private consumption decision of the individuals, the first method of 
financing allows partial-equilibrium analysis. We regard this as the benchmark scenario, which 
is compared to the second method of financing, where an increase in the income tax reduces 
disposable lifetime income, which in turn affects private consumption decisions. 
 
First, we look at the demand side only and study the effects of the reform measures on old-age 
provision for a given annuity price. It is shown that tax incentives for the purchase of life 
annuities indeed stimulate annuity demand, when they are financed by a reduction of public 
goods. By this, they counteract the negative effects on old-age consumption of the other two 
reform instruments, adopted to assure future financing of the social security system. However, 
when considering an increase in the income tax to finance the tax incentives, the positive effect 
on annuity demand is reduced and may even turn negative for some individuals. Thus, only a 
partial-equilibrium analysis, which neglects the opportunity costs of tax incentives for private 
old-age provision, supplies evidence that tax incentives are effective.  
 
However, the analysis described so far is based on the assumption of a constant annuity price. 
The second and more complex issue addressed in this paper concerns the effect of the three 
reform instruments on the equilibrium price, in view of the adverse-selection problem already 
mentioned. The fact that the annuity companies cannot distinguish individuals according to their 
life expectancy induces higher annuity demand of persons with a long life expectancy. As a 
consequence of the over-representation of annuities bought by high-risk individuals, insurance 
companies, in order to avoid losses, offer a price which is higher than the actuarially fair price 
based on the average survival probability of the population.
2 The inefficiently high price induces 
individuals, especially those with a low life expectancy, to decrease their demand or to drop out 
of the market. Thus the impact of a social security reform, which aims at a shift towards private 
old-age provision, on adverse selection is of great relevance: If it aggravates the problem of 
adverse selection, annuities will become an even less suitable strategy to provide for old-age, 
i.e. even less annuities will be traded.  
                                                       
2  Empirical studies for the well developed US annuity market give evidence that prices are about 7 – 15 % 
above the fair price due to adverse selection (Walliser, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1999; Friedman and 
Warshawsky, 1988, 1990). Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) find that adverse selection exists to some 
similar extent in the voluntary annuity market of the United Kingdom.    3
 
Previous work by Walliser (1998, 2000), Abel (1986) and Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled 
(1985) address the problem of whether or not the existence of a social security system 
improves efficiency of the private annuity market affected by adverse selection. The first two 
assume price competition in the annuity market, while the latter assumes price and quantity 
competition. Walliser computes the effects of a privatisation, i.e. the elimination, of the social 
security system, on the equilibrium price in a calibrated 75-period life-cycle model for a 
characteristic US cohort.
3 He shows that the elimination of the social security system reduces 
adverse selection by some small proportion. On the other hand, both the papers of Abel and of 
Eckstein et al. investigate the effect of a public fully-funded system, which can offer an 
actuarially fair rate of return, based on population average mortality. Abel shows that the 
introduction of a fully-funded social security exacerbates adverse selection. In contrast, Eckstein 
et al. find that in the presence of price and quantity competition in the annuity market, the 
introduction of a social security system can lead to a Pareto improvement. However, none of 
these papers investigates tax incentives for the purchase of life annuities, but each restricts 
attention to a situation, when a social security system is totally eliminated or introduced. We, 
instead, determine separately the effect of each reform measures on the equilibrium price. This 
allows us to discuss, which of them should be given priority for reasons of efficiency of the 
annuity market and which of them is more effective in increasing private old-age provision.  
 
In order to analyse the question, we consider N types of individuals, who differ in their life 
expectancy. Moreover, we allow for the possibility of heterogeneous income, which is assumed 
to have a non-negative impact on the survival probability.
4 Further, we assume price 
competition among the annuity companies, which implies that only a pooling equilibrium, where 
all individuals pay the same price per unit of annuity payoff, is possible.
5 We find that in this 
framework a cut in the social security benefits reduces the adverse-selection problem in the 
private annuity market, while an increase in the social security contributions exacerbates the 
problem of adverse selection. Both results hold unambiguously and highlight that for reasons of 
efficiency in the private annuity a cut in the social security benefits should be the preferred 
reform instrument to assure future financing of the social security system. On the other hand, 
we find that the effect of a tax incentive for life annuities on adverse selection is ambiguous and 
                                                       
3    Another simulation study about the privatisation of the social security system is that of Kotlikoff, 
Smetters and Walliser (1998). The authors compare two methods, mandatory participation in the new 
privatised system versus allowing the individuals to choose between entering the new privatised system 
or remaining in social security. Using a large-scale rational-expectations OLG simulation model, they 
find that both methods lead to long-run gains for all individuals. However, in the short run, the latter 
method may, despite adverse selection, produce more favourable macroeconomic and distributional 
outcomes than the former method. 
4  This approach is similar to that chosen by Walliser (1998, 2000). Abel (1986) and Eckstein et al. (1985) 
considered a model with two types of individuals with identical income and/or wealth. 
5  Price competition is usually adopted for the analysis of annuity markets; see Pauly (1974), Abel (1986), 
Brugiavini (1993), Walliser (2000), Brunner and Pech (2000, 2002).    4
depends on the degree of risk aversion of the individuals. The problem of adverse selection is 
reduced, if the coefficient of relative risk aversion does not exceed a critical value, which is 
shown that to be higher in case that the tax incentives are financed by a reduction in public 
goods compared to the case where they are financed by an increase in the income tax. 
Numerical calculations give some evidence that in the first case adverse selection is reduced for 
reasonable degrees of risk aversion, while in the second case the possibility that adverse 
selection is exacerbated cannot be excluded. Obviously this result reduces sharply the appeal 
of tax incentives as an instrument to stimulate private old-age provision. 
 
This paper is as organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic model is developed and the effects 
of the three instruments of the social security reform on annuity demand and consumption 
behaviour are discussed. In Section 3 it is analysed, how adverse selection, i.e. the difference 
between the equilibrium price and the actuarially fair price, is affected by these reform 
instruments. Section 4 summarises and concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. Annuity demand and consumption behaviour  
2.1. The basic model 
Consider an economy with M individuals who live for a maximum of two periods t = 0,1. In the 
working period 0, an individual i earns a fixed labour income wi, which is taxed at a proportional 
rate τw. The tax revenue used to finance government spending for public goods. At the end of 
the working period 0 the individual retires. Survival to the retirement period 1 is uncertain and 
occurs with probability  i π ,  1 0 i < π < . Provision for future consumption is guaranteed by a social 
security system, organized according to the pay-as-you-go method. The individual pays a 
proportional social security tax rate τS on income and receives a benefit Si(wi), which depends 
on income and can thus be regarded to be calculated according to a defined benefit formula.
6  
 
Preferences of an individual i for lifetime consumption of private goods cti and public goods gt 
are represented by expected utility. That is 
 
i
i0 i 1 i 0 1 U u(c ) u(c ) E v(g ,g )
1
π
=+ + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ +α
, (1) 
 
where α denotes the pure rate of time preference. u is the per-period utility function depending 




′ = ∞ . The specification in (1) means 
that the individual discounts old-age consumption c1i for two reasons, risk aversion and time 
                                                       
6  Note that this specification means that social security contributions are not deductible from income tax 
and benefits are tax exempt.   5
preference. v is the utility function derived from government spending of public goods, which 
enters (1) in an additively separable fashion. This assumption implies that the choice of private 
consumption is independent of public spending, which allows a partial-equilibrium analysis. 
Further note that the individual has no bequest motive.  
 
To smooth consumption over the uncertain lifetime appropriately, the individual can make 
private old-age provision in addition to the social security system. She can purchase an amount 
Ai of annuity payouts in the retirement period 1 (conditional on the individual's survival), which 
the annuity companies supply at a price Q per unit of the payout. Due to the lack of a bequest 
motive, she will decide for life annuities against holding wealth in the form of bonds, since the 
former can offer a higher rate of return than the latter (see Yaari, 1965). Individuals may receive 
a tax incentive for the purchase of life annuities. In this case, the price Q paid to the annuity 
companies differs from the consumer price R ≡ Q(1 − b), with b as the subsidy rate. Note that in 
this section we take the producer price Q as constant. The budget constraint in each period 
t = 0,1 reads 
 
0i i w S i cw ( 1 ) R A =− τ − τ − , (2) 
i i i 1 S A c + = . (3) 
 
In addition, we assume  0 Ai ≥ . By this, we rule out the possibility that the individual can sell 
annuities or raise a loan in the working period, whose redemption is guaranteed through a life 
insurance.
7 The individual decides on her consumption plan over the uncertain lifetime by 
maximizing (1) subject to (2) and (3). Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) and differentiating with 
respect to Ai, we obtain the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of this maximization problem, 
 
Ai > 0  and   i
iw S i i i Ru'(w (1 ) RA ) u'(A S ) 0
1
π
− −τ −τ − + + =
+α
, or  (4a) 
Ai = 0  and   i
iw S i i i Ru'(w (1 ) RA ) u'(A S ) 0
1
π




which determine annuity demand Ai(R, πi, α, τw, τS, wi, Si(wi)) for an individual i. The interior 
solution (4a) will hold, as long as the social security benefits Si are sufficiently small. In case 
that an individual i is over-annuitized due to high social security benefits, annuity demand is 
equal to zero. 
 
                                                       
7   See Yaari (1965). The same assumption is made by Friedman and Warshawsky (1988, 1990) and 
Walliser (1998, 2000). Abel (1986), on the other hand, makes sure that all individuals have a positive 
annuity demand by restricting the range of survival probabilities in the population and the level of the 
social security benefits.   6
2.2  The effects of a social security reform on consumption behaviour 
In this section we analyse the effects of a social security reform on annuity demand and on 
consumption behaviour for a given producer price Q. We consider the following reform 
measures: a cut of the social security benefits, an increase of the contribution rates and tax 
incentives for the purchase of private life annuities. While the first two measures are 
implemented to assure future financing of the public pension system
8, the intention of the latter 
measure is to encourage individuals to compensate the cut of the social security benefits by an 
increase of private old-age provision. First we show that both, a cut in the social security 
benefits and an increase in the contribution rate reduce consumption in old-age. Then we 
investigate whether tax incentives for the purchase of life annuities indeed counteract this effect, 
where we distinguish between two alternatives concerning the way they are financed: The 
government can either reduce the expenditures for public goods or can increase the income tax 
to keep the budget balanced. It turns out that this distinction in the method of financing is crucial 
for the results. 
 
Lemma 1: A cut in social security benefits increases annuity demand of an individual i, while an 
increase in the contribution rate reduces annuity demand, i.e.  0 dS dA i i <  and  iS dA d 0 τ<.
9 
A cut in social security benefits and an increase in the contribution rate reduce consumption in 
both periods t = 0,1, i.e.  0 dS dc i ti >  and ti S dc d 0 τ <  for t = 0,1. 
 
Proof:  0 dS dA i i <  and  iS dA d 0 τ< follow directly from implicit differentiation of (4a). Use (2) 
and (3), together with the formulas for  ii dA dS  and  iS dA dτ , to show that  0 dS dc i ti >  and 
ti S dc d 0, τ<  t = 0,1. 
10 Q.E.D. 
 
The results of Lemma 1 are illustrated in figures 1 – 2. The consumption possibility curve in 
(c0i,c1i)-space is derived by eliminating Ai in the budget constraints (2) and (3) of both periods t = 
0,1, which yields 
 
  iw S0 i
1i i




=+ −  for  0i i w S cw ( 1 ) ≤ −τ −τ . 
 
This relation describes the feasible consumption levels for an individual i in both periods under 
the given social security system (Si,τS) for any annuity level Ai ≥ 0. If an individual demands no 
annuities, she has a consumption level of  iw S w( 1 ) − τ− τ in the working period 0 and a 
consumption level of Si in the retirement period 1. Any unit of her net income invested into life 
                                                       
8  Since this assumption suffices for our analysis, we do not model explicitly the budget constraint for the 
social security system. 
9  For shortness, we write Ai instead of Ai(R, πi, α, τw, τS, wi, Si(wi)) from now on. 
10 Detailed proofs of this Lemma and also of the Propositions 1 and 2 are available on request.   7
annuities guarantees her an annuity payoff (and thus additional consumption) of Ai = 1/R in the 
retirement period. An individual i chooses annuity demand Ai and thus the consumption levels in 
both periods by maximizing (1) subject to the consumption possibility set. The optimal 
consumption vector is indicated by C'.  
 
 
Figure 1:  The effect of a cut in social  
  security benefits  
 
Figure 2:  The effect of an increase in the  
  social security tax  
 
A cut in the social security benefits Si for any given labour income wi, illustrated in figure 1, 
shifts the consumption possibility curve downwards (by the amount  i S ∆ ) and induces an 
individual i to consume less in both periods (see point C''). For the working period 0, this effect 
follows immediately from a higher annuity demand. Since the reduction of the social security 
benefits is larger than the increase in annuities, the overall effect on consumption in the 
retirement period is negative too. Thus consumption in both periods are normal goods, which is 
a well-known consequence of additively separable utility functions. For the same reason an 
increase in the social security tax also reduces consumption in both periods (see point C'' in 
figure 2). In this case, the consumption possibility curve shifts to the left (by the amount  Si w ∆τ ). 
An individual i chooses a lower level of annuities 
' '
i A  and, thus, a lower consumption level in the 
retirement period. She also consumes less in the working period, since the decrease in net 
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Finally consider a corner solution, where originally the optimal consumption levels of the 
individual are  iw S w( 1 ) −τ −τ  in the working period and Si in the retirement period. Such a 
situation occurs, if the public pension system offers the individual more than enough for old-age 
consumption (relatively to consumption in the working period). Obviously, a cut in the social 
security benefits reduces this over-consumption in old-age and induces the individual to buy 
annuities, if the cut is sufficiently large. On the other hand, an increase in the contribution rate 
will raise this relative over-consumption in old-age, thus the best the individual can do is to 
continue to demand no annuities.   
 
Next we investigate whether tax incentives for the purchase of life annuities indeed counteract 
the negative effects on old-age consumption of the other two reform instruments. We introduce 
the public budget constraint in a rudimentary way that will suffice for the upcoming analysis. In 
each period t, revenues from income tax must balance the government spending for public 
goods and for the subsidies for life annuities.
11 We denote average labour income by w  and 





wb Q A 0
M
τ− −= . (5) 
 
First we consider the case that the financing is provided by a cut of the expenditures for public 
goods. As this reduction in government spending does not influence the private consumption 
decision of the individuals, we regard this method of public financing as a benchmark scenario, 
which is then compared to the case, where the tax incentives are financed by an increase in the 
income tax, which in turn reduces disposable lifetime income and consequently private 
consumption. 
 
Proposition 1: Assume that the tax incentives for the purchase of private life annuities are 
financed by a reduction of government spending for public goods. Then a tax incentive for 
annuities increases annuity demand and thus consumption in the retirement period 1, i.e. 
i dA db 0 > ,  1i dc db 0 > . The effect of the tax incentive on consumption in the working period 0 


















Proof: Use R ≡ (1 − b)Q and proceed as in the proof of Lemma 1.   Q.E.D. 
 
                                                       
11  This means that each generation pays for the subsidies that it receives and for the public goods 
provided in its working period. However, the public goods which it consumes in its retirement period are 
paid by the next generation.    9
The introduction of a subsidy for private life annuities reduces the consumer price R' = Q to 
R'' = (1 −  b)Q. Thus the consumption possibility curve rotates upwards (see figure 3) and 
individual i moves to the new optimum, point C''. She chooses a higher level of annuities 
' '
i A  
and thus a higher consumption level 
' '
i 1 c  in the retirement period 1. She may also consume 





i QA ) b 1 ( QA − > , and the positive income effect of the price decrease on c0i 
outweighs the negative substitution effect.
12  
 
Figure 3: The effect of a tax incentive for life annuities 
 
Consequently, financing tax incentives for private life annuities by a cut in government spending 
on public goods stimulates annuity demand and indeed counteracts the negative effects of the 
other two reform measures on old-age consumption. This effect is in accordance with the 
intention of the policymakers to avoid a gap in old-age provision due to a change in the 
parameters of the public pension system. 
 
To show how these results depend on the assumption that this reduction of the supply of public 
goods has no effect on annuity demand we consider another method of financing, namely the 
increase in the proportional income tax τw which, obviously, has the same negative effect on 
                                                       









































annuity demand as the proportional social security tax τS, discussed above. In this case, the 
positive effect on annuity demand and old-age consumption is smaller and can even turn 
negative for some individuals, as will be shown in the following Proposition 2. There we confine 
attention to the introduction of a subsidy, i.e. to a small increase in the subsidy rate b, starting 
from an initial situation in which b = 0. This increase in b has to be financed by an increase in τw, 







= . (6) 
 
(6) demonstrates that given a small increase  b ∆  of the subsidy rate, the tax rate τw has to be 
increased by  w bQA w ∆τ = ∆  to keep the public budget balanced. Thus, each individual i pays 
an additional income tax in the amount of  i bQAw w ∆ . On the other hand, she saves  i bQA ∆  in 
annuity expenditures. As one expects, it is the ratio of  i Aw w  to  i A , which is decisive for the 
effects of introducing a subsidy for life annuities.
13 
 
Proposition 2: Assume that a tax incentive for the purchase of private life annuities is 
introduced and financed by an increase in the income tax rate τw, such that the public budget 
constraint (5) remains fulfilled. Then the effects on annuity demand, consumption in both 
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Proof: Use (6) and proceed as in the proof of Proposition 1. To determine  i b0 dU db
= , use of 
(1) – (3) and apply the Envelope Theorem.   Q.E.D. 
 
To explain the effects of introducing a tax incentive for life annuities, we assume for the moment 
that labour income is identical for all individuals, i.e.  i ww = . Then for each individual, the 
                                                       
13  Note that the RHS of (6) can be interpreted as describing the necessary increase of τw under the 
assumption that the public budget constraint (5) remains fulfilled for a fixed average annuity demand  A, 
ignoring the second-round effects bQ A b ∂ ∂  on τw for an initial situation b > 0. By this, the results of 
Proposition 2 can also be regarded as a characterization of first-round effects of an increase of b, where 
the adjustments of aggregate annuity demand are neglected.    11
additional tax payment adds up to  bQA ∆  (see above), which is traded off against the received 
subsidy  i bQA ∆ . First, let annuity demand of an individual i be equal to the average annuity 
demand, i.e.  i AA = . Then she is as well-off as before the introduction of the subsidy; the 
amount the individual pays in form of a higher income tax corresponds exactly to her maximum 
willingness-to-pay for the introduction of the tax subsidies. Since only the substitution effect 
remains, the individual chooses a higher level of annuities and of old-age consumption, and a 
lower level of consumption in the working period. Such a situation is drawn in Figure 3, where 
the consumption possibility curve rotates around the indifference curve through the original 
consumption bundle C'. In this way, the relative price for old-age consumption as well as 
disposable income decrease such that the individual can afford a consumption bundle C''' that is 
just indifferent to her original bundle C'. 
 
An individual with above-average annuity demand pays a smaller amount in form of additional 
income tax than she would be willing to pay in order to receive the subsidy for tax incentives. 
Thus, she is better off and consumes more in the retirement period. The effect on consumption 
in the working period is ambiguous and may be positive as well. On the other hand, in case that 
annuity demand of an individual is below average, the additional payment of income tax 
exceeds her maximum willingness-to-pay for receiving the subsidy for life annuities.
14 Thus, this 
individual is worse off. Moreover, she consumes less in the working period, and the effect on 
annuity demand is ambiguous. It may be optimal for her to reduce also annuity demand and 
thus old-age consumption.  
 
This result means that for some individuals tax incentives for life annuities may have an 
opposite effect than intended, if they are financed by an increase in the income tax. In 
particular, this may be the case, if the income effect of the subsidy is smaller than the offsetting 
income effect due to an increase in the income tax. Besides the effects on consumption 
behaviour, financing tax incentives for life annuities by an increase in the income tax has a 
redistributive impact. Those individuals who pay a higher income tax than they acquire 
subsidies are made worse-off. In case of identical income these are those with below-average 
annuity demand. The intuition is obvious: They have to finance not only the subsidies they 
receive themselves, but also part of the subsidies for those individuals with above-average 
annuity demand. The latter in turn are better off. However note that with uniform pricing of 
annuities the individuals with above-average annuity demand are those, who on average live 
longer (see next section). Consequently, the introduction of tax incentives financed by the 
income tax would redistribute from individuals with a low life expectancy to individuals with high 
life expectancy. Note however that similar applies in case that the tax incentives are financed by 
                                                       
14  In this case, the "new" consumption possibility curve with slope -1/(1-b)Q would lie below the 
indifference curve through the original optimum C'.   12
a cut in the supply in public goods: Individuals with high annuity demand benefit more, since 
they receive more subsidies than those with a lower annuity demand, while the utility loss due to 
the lower supply of public goods is the same for all individuals.  
 
Altogether, when looking at the combined effect of a social security reform, which introduces tax 
incentives for private life annuities in addition to a cut in the social security benefits (or/and an 
increase in the contribution rates), we conclude that it is crucial which assumptions concerning 
the financing of the tax incentives are considered: Using a partial equilibrium approach, where a 
cut in the government spending of the public goods has no influence on the private old-age 
provision, it turn outs that tax incentives stimulate annuity demand and indeed counteract the 
negative effects of the other two reform measures on old-age consumption. However, assuming 
an increase in the income tax, which has a negative effect on annuity demand, the positive 




3. Adverse Selection in the private annuity market 
3.1 Equilibrium  
In the previous section we focused on the demand side and analysed the consumption 
behaviour of an individual for any given annuity price Q. Now we introduce the supply side to 
study the equilibrium outcomes, i.e. how the price of annuities adjusts in order to make demand 
and supply decisions compatible, when there is asymmetric information between the economic 
agents. For this analysis, we make the following assumptions: The population with a total 
number of M individuals consists of N groups, N ≤ M. Each group i = 1,2, …, N, is characterized 
by a different survival probability πi and has a share γi in total population, with 0 < γi < 1 and 
1
N
1 i i = γ ∑ = . The groups are ordered according to their survival probabilities: 
0 < π1 < π2 < … < πN < 1. Besides, we allow for heterogeneous income, where the assumption is 
made that w1 ≤ w2 ≤ … ≤ wN. From this it follows that survival probability and income are not 
negatively correlated, which is in accordance with empirical evidence.
15 Note that each type i is 
characterized by the pair (πi,wi). The survival probabilities πi and the group shares γi are public 
information, known by the annuity companies. But it is the private information for each individual 
to know her type, i.e. her probability of survival. As a consequence, there is an adverse-
selection problem in the annuity market: Because of asymmetric information the first-best 
                                                       
15 It is well known from many empirical studies that the survival probability is correlated positively with 
income besides other indicators of socioeconomic status, as wealth and education; see e.g. Attanasio 
and Hoynes (2000), Feinstein (1993), Hurd and McGarry (1995), Lillard and Panis (1998), Lillard and 
Waite (1995), Menchik (1993) among others.   13
outcome, in which each type i can buy annuities at her individually fair price according to her 
survival probability, i.e. Qi = πi, cannot be realized.
16 
 
Moreover, we assume that insurance companies cannot monitor whether consumers hold 
annuities from other insurance companies. It follows that there is price competition among the 
annuity companies.
17 In equilibrium only one selling price Q can exist, which is offered to all 
individuals. Such a situation is called a pooling equilibrium. Since the annuity companies 
behave perfectly competitive, the expected profits of a pooling contract with price Q must be 
equal to zero. It is obvious that the equilibrium price must lie between π1, the individually fair 
price for type 1 with the lowest life expectancy, and πN, the fair price for type N with the highest 
life expectancy. For any price lower than π1, annuity companies would suffer a loss and for any 
price higher than πN, an annuity company could slightly reduce price and profitably attract all 
types. We write Ai(R(Q,b)) as annuity demand which depends on the consumer price R, which 
in turn is determined by the producer price Q and the subsidy rate b. P(Q) denotes the expected 
profits, which we obtain by subtracting total expected annuity payoffs from total revenues
18, i.e. 
 
  () () ) b , Q ( R A ) b , Q ( R A Q ) Q ( P
N
1 i i i i
N
1 i i i ∑ ∑ = = γ π − γ ≡ . (7) 
 
The equilibrium price Q
~
 is implicitly defined by the zero-profit condition P(Q
~
) = 0. Let εi be the 
demand share of group i in aggregate annuity demand, defined by 
N
ii i j j j1 AA
= ε≡ γ γ ∑ . Then 




ii i1 QR ( Q , b ) 0
= −π ε = ∑
 , (8) 
 
where we assume that  i(R(Q,b)) 0 ε≥   for all i = 1,…,N, and  j(R(Q,b)) 0 ε >   for at least two 
{} j 1,...,N ∈ . This assumption ensures that there is an adverse selection problem in the annuity 
market, because at least two types indeed buy annuities.  
 
                                                       
16  Note that it is usually assumed that income is observable and verifiable. In this case the insurance 
companies could deduct from the income level to the survival probability. This would put them in the 
position to differentiate prices on the basis of income. However, this is not common practice in real 
world. Particularly, as far as we know, in no country price differentiation on the basis of income is utilized 
by the insurance companies. The following reasons to explain this behaviour come into considerations: 
First, it might be the case that income is not verifiable and only imperfectly observable, as e.g. in 
Germany and Austria due to protection of data privacy. Second, insurance companies might worry about 
that such a practice could not withstand the legal challenge and/or could be sanctioned by costumers, 
because it offends the social norms and fails the demand for justice. There is some evidence that the 
latter reason explains why we do not observe price discrimination on racial lines in the U.S, although 
empirical studies show a lower life expectancy of ethnical minorities like African Americans.  
17 Price competition appears to be a more plausible assumption than price and quantity competition, which 
requires that individuals can buy only one insurance contract, but generates the possibility of a 
separating equilibrium (see Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Wilson, 1977).  
18  For simplicity it is assumed that the interest rate is zero, which has no influence on the qualitative 
results.   14
Note that the equilibrium price is only unique, if (7), a continuous function of Q, is strictly 
increasing, i.e.  0 ) Q ( P > ′ . In general however, multiple equilibria are possible; their occurrence 
depends on the specifics of the per-period utility function u and, accordingly, on the behaviour of 
the annuity demand functions. Since Q
~
 must be a weighted average of all survival probabilities, 
i.e. π1 < Q
~
 < πN, we have  ) ( P 0 ) ( P N 1 π < < π . It follows that there is at least one root of (8) for 
which  0 ) Q
~
( P ≥ ′ , while those roots of the zero-profit condition (8), for which  0 ) Q ( P < ′ , cannot 
constitute an equilibrium by the following reasoning: If such a price prevailed, an annuity 
company could offer a slightly lower price and profitably attract all annuity purchases.
19 
Henceforth, we assume that  0 ) Q
~
( P > ′ .
20  
 
In a first step, we show that the equilibrium price Q
~
 is higher than the actuarially fair price, 
which corresponds to the average survival probabilities 
N
ii i1 = γ π ∑  of the individuals. This is due 
to the adverse-selection effect: The fact that individuals have more information about their 
survival probability than annuity companies induces higher annuity demand of those individuals 
with long life expectancy. As a consequence of this over-representation of annuities bought by 
high-risk individuals, insurance companies offer a price which is higher than the fair price in 
order to avoid losses.  
 
Lemma 2: Consider a price Q
~
 which, together with  i A 0 ≥  for i = 1,…,N and  j A0 >  for at least 
two  {} j 1 ,...,N ∈ , fulfils the zero- profit condition (8). The equilibrium price Q
~
 is higher than the 
actuarially fair price, characterized by
N
ii i1 Q,
= ≡ γπ ∑  if Aj ≥ Ai for all j > i and Aj > Ai for some j > i. 
 
Proof: We determine the difference  Q Q
~
− . By use of (8) and  ∑ = π γ ≡
N
1 i i i Q , we obtain  
 








ii i j j j1 A A








⎛⎞ −= π γ − γ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑




j j j1 AA
= ≡γ ∑ . Because  1
N




iij i j i1 j1
1
QQ A A
A == −= π γ γ − ∑∑
 , (11) 
 
                                                       
19 See also Abel (1986), Walliser (1998). 
20 It can be easily shown that for the CRRA per-period utility function (17), profits P(Q) are strictly concave 
for a coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ = 1 (logarithmic utility). In this case there is a unique 
equilibrium price Q   between π1 and πN and P (Q) 0 ′ >  .   15




j ii j j i j1 i1
1
QQ ( ) ( A A )
A == −= π − π γ γ − ∑∑
 . (12) 
 
Since for any two types j > i, πj > πi, the RHS of (12) is positive, if Aj ≥ Ai for all j > i and Aj > Ai for 
some j > i.  Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 2 has demonstrated that the equilibrium price Q   is above the actuarially fair price Q, if 
the following condition holds: Some high-risk types demand more annuities than any type with a 
lower risk and none of the former demands less annuities than the latter.
21 In a next step, we 
give attention to this condition. Under the assumption that types differ only in their survival 
probability, but have identical income, the result that individuals with a higher life expectancy 
demand more annuities, holds unambiguously. This has been shown and employed in various 
contributions about adverse selection; see e.g. Abel (1986), Eckstein et. al (1985), Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976). In a framework where individuals may differ also in their income, Walliser 
(1998) obtained the same (unambiguous) result, given the assumption of fixed social security 
benefits, which means that they do not depend on income. However, this issue becomes more 
complex, if the more plausible case that social security benefits vary with income is taken into 
account. This issue is investigated in the next two Lemmas.  
 
Lemma 3: Assume that  ij A,A 0 > ,  { } i,j 1 ,...,N ∈ . For any consumer price R, an individual of type 
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wS 0 i R(1 )u (c ) ′′ −τ −τ . (13) 
 
Proof:  First, we show that  0 d dA i i > π . The effect of a marginal change in the survival 
probability  πi, is determined by implicit differentiation of the first-order condition for annuity 




















                                                       
21 Note that  QQ0 −>   holds even in the case that only one type buys annuities at the equilibrium price Q   
(see (12)). Obviously this must be type N, who is then charged a price  N Q = π   (see (8)). This price 
corresponds to the individually fair price of group N. However, due to adverse selection the individually 
fair prices of any other type i ≠ N will not be offered, since then type N would buy the annuity at the lower 
price  i π , i ≠ N, and the annuity companies would suffer a loss.   16
Since the denominator of the RHS of (14) is negative due to the second-order condition of the 
maximization problem,  i i d dA π  has the same sign as the numerator of the RHS of (14). The 
latter reads 
 
















which is positive.  
 
Next, we determine  i i dw dA  by implicit differentiation of (4a). Since the denominator is the 





wS 0 i 1 i
ii i
US ( w )
R(1 )u (c ) u (c )
Aw 1 w
∂π ∂
′′ ′′ =− −τ −τ +
∂∂ + α ∂
, (16) 
 
i i dw dA  is nonnegative, if (13) is fulfilled. 
 
Consider annuity demand Ai(wi,πi) > 0 and Aj(wj,πj) > 0 for i < j, where πi < πj and wi ≤ wj, given 
that (13) is fulfilled. In this case,  0 d dA i i > π  and  0 dw dA i i ≥ , and it follows that 
Ai(wi, πi) < Aj(wj, πj).   Q.E.D. 
 
Note from the first part of the proof (see (15)) that, as already mentioned, a higher survival 
probability induces higher annuity demand, given that different risk-types have identical income. 
Moreover, in case of heterogeneous income, it is condition (13), which implies  0 dw dA i i ≥  
and, thus, guarantees that annuity demand is higher for higher types j > i (remember that wi and 
πi are taken as non-negatively correlated). One observes that the condition (13) is certainly 
fulfilled, if  0 w ) w ( S i i i ≤ ∂ ∂ , i.e. social security benefits do not increase with income, because in 
this case the LHS of (13) is non-negative, while the RHS is negative. To explain this result, 
consider the case when social security benefits do not depend on income, i.e.  0 w S i i = ∂ ∂ : For 
fixed Si, higher income induces higher annuity demand, since part of the additional income, 
received in the working period, is shifted to the retirement period.
22 Further, recall from Lemma 
1 that a cut in social security benefits increases annuity demand. Thus,  i i w A ∂ ∂  is also 
positive, if  0 w S i i < ∂ ∂ . 
 
Finally, note that  0 w ) w ( S i i i ≤ ∂ ∂  is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition. (13) is also 
fulfilled, if  i i w S ∂ ∂  is positive and not too large. In the next Lemma we show for a specific class 
                                                       
22 Note  that  0 w S i i = ∂ ∂  correspond to the assumption used by Walliser (1998), mentioned above. 
Regulations, which realise  0 w S i i = ∂ ∂  below and above a certain threshold of income, are indeed in 
force: On the one hand there are flat-rate pensions, which guarantee a minimum retirement income, on 
the other hand often an assessment ceiling for calculating benefits and contributions exists.   17
of per-period utility functions that annuity demand increases with higher types j > i, when social 
security benefits increase proportionally (or less) with income. For this, we consider the utility 
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with  ) (c u ) (c u c ti ti ti ′ ′ ′ − = ρ . Since individuals are assumed to be risk avers, the CRRA-utility 
function (CRRA abbreviates Constant Relative Risk Aversion) exhibits ρ > 0. In case of an 
interior solution Ai > 0 we can derive from the condition (4a) together with (17) an explicit 
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where si(wi) is defined as  ii ii i s( w) S( w)w ≡ , that is the ratio of the benefits to labour income. If 
si is equal for all types i, then benefits Si rise proportionally with income. Thus we call si the 
average benefit rate in the following.  
 
Lemma 4: Let  ij A,A 0 >  be the interior solution (18) given CRRA utility,  {} i,j 1 ,...,N ∈ . For any 
consumer price R, an individual of type i has a lower annuity demand than any individual of type 
j > i, as long as social security benefits are not rising more than proportionally with income, i.e. 
Ai < Aj for any two types i < j, if si ≥ sj. 
 
Proof: Substituting (18) into the difference Aj − Ai gives 
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 ≥ 1, it follows that the 















R , is positive, if si ≥ sj. The same holds for the 
                                                       
23 Note that α has the same effect as πi. So, for simplicity, we assume a time preference rate α of zero.   18























i Φ π > Φ π
ρ ρ , i.e. 
() ()
11 1 11 1 11
wS j wS i ij i ij j (1 ) R s (1 ) R s
ρρ ρ ρρ ρ ρρ π π −τ −τ − π > π π −τ −τ − π , if si ≥ sj.   Q.E.D. 
 
Altogether, we can conclude that Lemmas 3 and 4 provide a strong indication for the existence 
of an adverse-selection problem in the annuity market, also in the case of heterogeneous 
income. In general, annuity demand is higher for types j > i, when social security benefits do not 
increase too much with income. In particular this holds for the CRRA-utility function, when 
benefits increase proportionally (or less) with income. Probably every existing social security 
system has this property.  
 
As a consequence of the over-representation of annuities bought by high-risk types, Q
~
 is above 
the actuarially fair price  Q , which corresponds to the average survival probabilities of the 
individuals, as shown in Lemma 2. Further, it follows from this Lemma that the difference  Q Q
~
−  
increases, when the difference in annuity demand of different risk-types increases. From 
Lemma 3 and 4 it is obvious that this difference is greater, the higher the (positive) correlation 
between survival probabilities and income and the less social security benefits increase relative 
to income. These two factors aggravate the problem of adverse selection. 
 
3.2 The effect of the social security reform on adverse selection 
In this section we turn our attention to the question of how the problem of adverse selection is 
affected by the three policy measures of the social security reform, introduced in section 2.2. 
This is an important issue, since adverse selection is regarded as a major reason for the fact 
that there is so little trade of life annuities. If a reform instrument exacerbates adverse selection, 
then even less annuities will be traded. As already mentioned in the introduction, Abel (1986) 
and Walliser (1998, 2000) have shown that under price competition the problem of adverse 
selection in the private annuity market is more severe in an economy with a social security 
system than without. Their findings, however, do not give advice concerning the problem in the 
centre of the current debates, how to reform social security to maintain its future solvency and 
simultaneously to ensure adequate old-age provision for the individuals. The aim of this section 
is to contribute to this debate by answering the following two questions, concerning the effects 
on adverse selection in the annuity market: If a reform is necessary to assure financing of social 
security, should it be a cut in the benefits or an increase in the contributions to social security? If 
a tax incentive for the purchase of life annuities is introduced to counteract the negative effects 
of the other two reform measures on old-age consumption, can it indeed serve its purpose?  
 
Remember from the previous section that it is the over-representation of annuities bought by 
high-risk individuals, which is responsible for the fact that the equilibrium price Q
~
 is inefficiently   19
high. Thus, for the effect of a change of any exogenous parameter X on Q
~
, it is crucial to which 
extent the different risk-types adjust their annuity demand. If the demand share of high-risk 
types increases (decreases), Q
~
 increases (decreases). This is shown in the following Lemma 5, 
which then allows us to conclude in Proposition 3 and 4 whether the adverse-selection problem 
is alleviated or aggravated by each of the three reform instruments. 
 
Lemma 5: Consider a price Q
~
 which, together with  i A 0 ≥  for all i = 1,…,N and  ij A,A 0 >  for 
some  {} i,j 1 ,...,N ∈ , fulfils the zero-condition profit condition (8). The effect of a marginal change 
in any exogenous parameter X on the equilibrium price Q
~
 depends on the percentage change 
of annuity demand of any type i, compared to that of any other type j, in the following way: 
 
















X A ∂ ∂
  for all types i < j with  ij A,A 0 > . 
 
Proof: The effect of a marginal change of exogenous parameter X on the equilibrium price Q
~
 is 
obtained by implicit differentiation of the zero-profit condition (8), where annuity demand and, 
consequently, the demand share εi of group i in aggregate annuity demand depends on Q
~
 and 
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Since the denominator of the RHS of (21) (see the considerations following (7)) is positive, the 
sign of  X Q
~
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where the first term 
N
ii i1 Q
= −π ε ∑
  of the RHS of (22) is equal to zero, due to zero-profit condition 
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which in turn can be transformed to  
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For any two types j > i, we have πj > πi and εi,εj ≥ 0. From this together with (28) it follows that 
the sign of  X P ∂ ∂  is determined by  j ji i (A X )A (A X )A ∂∂ − ∂∂ of all those pairs of types i, j with 











X A ∂ ∂
 for any two types i < j with 
Ai,Aj > 0, then  X P ∂ ∂ <
> _





 0.  Q.E.D. 
 
Thus, adverse selection remains unchanged in case that the relative change of annuity demand 
is equal for all types i, j. On the other hand, adverse selection is alleviated, i.e. Q
~
 decreases, if 
as a reaction to a marginal change in any exogenous variable, the percentage increase 
(decrease) of annuity demand of a low-risk type i is higher (lower) than the percentage increase 
(decrease) of annuity demand of a high-risk type j. In this case, the demand share of the low-
risk types increases. For unchanged Q
~
, this shift in the composition of aggregate annuity 
demand to the "profitable" types would lead to an increase in profits. In order to restore the zero 
profits, the equilibrium price Q
~
 must fall. By the same argument, it can be explained that Q
~
 
rises, if the percentage increase (decrease) of annuity demand of a low-risk type is lower 
(higher) than the percentage increase (decrease) of annuity demand of a high-risk type. 
   21
With this result, we are ready to determine the effect of the social security reform on adverse 
selection by comparing the percentage change of annuity demand of any two types i and j due 
to a marginal change in each of the reform instruments. In order to obtain clear-cut results, we 
consider the per-period CRRA-utility function (17) introduced in section 3.1, which is 
characterized by a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ. First, we consider a cut in the 
average benefit-rate  ii ii i s( w) S( w)w ≡  and an increase in the social security tax τS. Then, we 
turn to tax incentives for the purchase of life annuities, assuming the same two alternatives of 
financing as in section 2.2.  
 
Proposition 3: Let  ij A,A 0 >  be the interior solution (18) given CRRA utility,  {} i,j 1 ,...,N ∈  and 
assume that social security benefits do not increase more than proportionally with income. The 
percentage change of annuity demand of any type i compared to any other type j > i is 
characterized as follows: 











∂ ∂τ ∂∂ τ
< . 
As a consequence, a cut in the average benefit rate  ii i sS w ≡  alleviates adverse selection in 
the private annuity market, while an increase in the social security tax τS exacerbates adverse 
selection.  
 
Proof: See the Appendix.  
 
Proposition 3 shows that an increase in the social security tax τS raises the demand share of the 
high-risk individuals, since the percentage decrease of annuity demand is higher for the low-risk 
types than for the high-risk types. This, together with Lemma 5, implies that the equilibrium price 
rises. On the contrary, a cut in the average benefit rate si reduces the over-representation of 




Concerning old-age consumption, we can conclude to the overall effects: We know from Lemma 
1 that both reform instruments reduce old-age consumption for any given price Q. However, due 
to adverse selection in the annuity market, there is a second effect: An increase in the social 
security tax raises the equilibrium price, which in turn leads to an even stronger decline in old-
age consumption (since  i1 cQ 0 ∂∂ < ). On the other hand, a cut in the average benefit rate 
reduces the distortion of equilibrium price. By this, the overall decline in old-age consumption 
will occur to a lower degree compared to the case of a fixed price (without adverse selection).  
                                                       
24 However, in case that not the benefit-income-ratio si, but the social security benefits Si are considered 
as the relevant measure, the effects on adverse selection are ambiguous, which is shown in the 
Appendix. Unambiguous effects are only obtained in case that individuals have identical income (see 
also Abel (1986)) or in case that social security benefits are introduced (see also Walliser (2000)).    22
 
Finally we investigate how tax incentives for the purchase of life annuities affect adverse 
selection. This is an important issue not only for reasons of efficiency, but also for the success 
of stimulating private old-age provision. In case that tax incentives for the purchase of life 
annuities reduce adverse selection, the consumer price R = Q(1 – b) decreases for two 
reasons: There is the direct effect of the increase in the subsidy rate ∆b and the indirect effect of 
the decrease in the equilibrium price  i Q ∆ . However, if adverse selection is aggravated, the 
equilibrium price  i Q increases, which then counteracts the positive influence of the tax incentive 
on the consumer price R. Obviously this reduces sharply the attractiveness of tax incentives as 
an instrument to stimulate private old-age provision.  
 
As in section 2.2., we distinguish between two ways to keep the public budget balanced: The 
tax incentive can be financed (i) by a reduction in the government expenditures for public goods 
or (ii) by an increase in the income tax. Note that for the latter case (ii) we restrict to show the 
effects of an increase in the subsidy rate b starting from an initial situation in which b = 0, while 
for the former case (i) the effects are shown for any initial b ≥ 0.  
 
Proposition 4: Let  ij A,A 0 >  be the interior solution (18) given CRRA utility,  {} i,j 1 ,...,N ∈ , and 
assume that social security benefits do not increase more than proportionally with income. Let 
the subsidy rate b for life annuities be financed  
(i) by a reduction in public goods or    (ii) by an increase in the income tax  
such that the public budget constraint (5) remains fulfilled. The percentage change of annuity 
demand of any type i, compared to any other type j > i, depends on the constant coefficient of 
relative risk aversion ρ as follows:  




















As a consequence, a tax incentive b for private life annuities alleviates adverse selection in the 
annuity market, if the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion ρ is smaller than a critical 
value, which is higher in case (i) than in case (ii). Otherwise, the effect is indeterminate.  
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
Proposition 4 shows that in both cases (i) and (ii) the effects of a tax incentive for private life 
annuities on adverse selection depend on the degree of risk aversion. For sufficiently low values 
of ρ adverse selection is reduced. Otherwise the effect is indeterminate and can turn negative   23
for high values of ρ. In the Appendix 5.2 we provide numerical computations illustrating 
Proposition 4 for two risk-types, when in both cases (i) and (ii) a tax incentive for life annuities 
are introduced. We distinguish between two scenarios: Scenario 1 (see Table 1) considers a 
more generous social security system (with higher values of τS, s1, s2) than Scenario 2 (see 
Table 2). Besides we allow for a variation of the values of π1, γ1, s1 and w1 (see "sub-scenarios" 
a – e) and of the coefficient of the relative risk aversion ρ. These calculations should exemplify 
what degrees of risk aversion are required for a mitigation, aggravation, resp., of adverse 




First consider case (i) where the tax incentive is financed by a reduction of public goods. 
Proposition 4 shows that if ρ is smaller than a critical value ρ*, which is greater than one, the 
percentage increase of annuity demand is higher for low-risk types than for high-risk types 
(remember that  i A b0 ∂∂ > , see Proposition 1). Thus, the over-representation of annuities 
bought by the high-risk individuals decreases, which implies, together with Lemma 5, that the 
equilibrium price Q   decreases. The numerical computations in Appendix 5.2 show that given 
the generous social security system in Scenario 1, the critical value ρ* is above 16 for the 
parameter constellations of 1a – 1d), only for the parameter constellation of 1e (identical 
income) ρ* takes a value of 9.85. Given the moderate social security system in Scenario 2, the 
critical value ρ* is lower, but still far above one. It varies from 13.3 (for the parameter 
constellation of 2b) to 3.4 (for the parameter constellation of 2e).  
 
Second, consider case (ii) where the tax incentive is financed by an increase in the income tax. 
Proposition 4 shows that adverse selection is alleviated for any ρ < ρ**, where the critical value 
ρ** is smaller than the critical value ρ* in case (i). This result is reproduced in the numerical 
computations of Appendix 5.2. Further, recall from Proposition 2 that the introduction of a tax 
incentive may have a negative effect on annuity demand for individuals with below-average 
annuity-demand. From Lemma 3 and 4 it follows that these individuals are the low-risk types. 
For high-risk individuals (those with above-average annuity demand) the effect is positive. 
Obviously, if such a situation occurs, then the demand share of the high-risk types increases, 
thus the problem of adverse selection is aggravated and the equilibrium price Q
~
 increases. 
Such a situation is reproduced in Appendix 5.2 for the parameter constellations of 1a and 2a, if 
ρ equals 16. Moreover, adverse selection is also aggravated, if annuity demand of both risk-
types increases by the introduction of a tax incentive, yet that of the low-risk individuals by a 
lower percentage than that of the high-risk individuals. Given the moderate social security 
system (see Table 2) such a situation occurs for any ρ ≥ 3 and adverse selection is alleviated 
                                                       
25 Note that given two risk-groups only, adverse selection rises for any ρ > ρ*. This follows from the fact 
that in this case the critical value ρ* coincides with 
j
i ρ 
, defined in Appendix 5.1.    24
only for ρ ≤ 2. Given the more generous system (see Table 1) adverse selection is alleviated for 
lower values of risk aversion ρ ≤ 4 (for parameter constellations of 1a – 1d), ρ ≤ 3 (for parameter 
constellations of 1e). 
 
Altogether, we can conclude that the degree of risk aversion is crucial for the effects on adverse 
selection. Numerical calculations give some evidence that, in case (i) where the reduction of the 
supply of public goods has no impact on annuity demand, adverse selection is reduced for 
reasonable degrees of risk aversion, at least for a wide range of parameter constellations. 
However in case (ii) where the increase of the income tax has a negative effect on annuity 
demand, one should not be confident and eliminate the possibility that the introduction of a tax 
incentive exacerbates the problem of adverse selection. Numerical computations, although 
exemplarily, show that this can be the case for reasonably high coefficients of risk aversion 




Governments of many developed nations are now looking to reform their social security systems 
to respond to the anticipated development in demography. They strive for an increase in self-
provision for retirement in order to compensate the reduction of the legal responsibility to 
provide financial support for the retired. Tax incentives for the purchase of private life annuities 
enjoy great popularity as one obvious policy option to achieve this purpose. The main 
justification for having them implemented is based on paternalism: Tax incentives should keep 
myopic individuals from making to little old-age provision and thus from ending up in poverty 
when retired. This is regarded as an imminent danger by governments that want to shift 
responsibility for old-age provision away from the public sector towards the individuals.
26 
However, how effective are tax incentives in stimulating the purchase of life annuities? This 
paper highlights this question regarding causes which might inhibit the desired effect. Besides, it 
has focused on a cut of the social security benefits and on increase of the social security tax, 
two potential reform measures to maintain the long-run solvency of the social security system.  
 
In a partial-equilibrium framework with a constant producer price, where the impact of the 
budgetary costs of state subsidies on private consumption decision is neglected, the 
                                                       
26 Some empirical studies tried to answer the difficult question whether individuals actually do make too 
little private old-age provision. In a survey, Disney (2000) concludes that there is some evidence from 
the UK and the USA. Especially for low-earners, saving rates are below those required for appropriate 
smoothing of lifetime consumption according to the life cycle hypothesis. Recent studies for Great Britain 
confirm these findings (Disney et al., 2001a; Disney et al., 2001b). On the other hand, there is 
contradictory evidence for Germany: Schnabel (2000) finds that even in the periods of retirement there 
is positive saving, although lower than in the working periods. This indicates that at present elderly 
people have (more than) enough retirement income at their disposal.   25
introduction of tax incentives for life annuities leads to stimulation of annuity demand. This result 
was shown in a two-period model based on individual utility maximisation subject to uncertainty 
about life expectancy, where a cut of the government spending for public goods to finance the 
tax incentives does not influence private old-age provision. However, tax incentives for the 
purchase of life annuities are less effective in increasing self-provision, when partial-equilibrium 
analysis is dropped. In particular, we incorporated an increase in the proportional income tax to 
keep the public budget in balance. In this case, the positive effect on annuity demand is smaller 
and it may even be optimal for some individuals to reduce their annuity demand. This 
counterintuitive result may occur, if the negative income effect due to an increase in the income 
tax is higher than the positive income effect of the subsidy for life annuities. Hence, the 
individuals most likely concerned are those with low life expectancy, who purchase only a small 
amount of annuities, but pay a high income tax. Obviously these are also the ones, who are 
made worse-off by the introduction of tax incentives.  
 
These considerations bring us to the question about the distributional effects of the benefits and 
costs associated with tax incentives. Because individuals with a high life expectancy demand 
more annuities and thus acquire a higher total of subsidies than individuals with a low life 
expectancy, there is an unequal distribution of the benefits in favour of individuals who on 
average live longer. But to what extent are the individuals affected negatively in their well-being 
by the budgetary costs? First, suppose that the budgetary costs arise in the form of a cut in the 
supply of public goods. Under the assumption of identical preferences for public goods (as in 
our model), it is straightforward to conclude that individuals with a higher life expectancy benefit 
at the expense of those with lower life expectancy. However, when allowing individuals to differ 
in their preferences for public goods (with no systematic correlation to life expectancy), no 
conclusive statement can be given. Second, suppose that tax incentives are financed by an 
increase in the income tax and that the individuals earn identical income. Then all individuals 
pay the same amount of additional income tax and tax incentives for life annuities induce again 
redistribution from individuals with high life expectancy to individuals with low life expectancy. 
This redistributive effect is alleviated, if the individuals with low survival probability are assumed 
to be those who earn a lower income.
27 In this context, it is worth to recall that uniform pricing of 
annuities already implies redistribution towards the high-risk types compared to the first-best 
outcome where each risk-type receives a price according to his survival probability. In view of 
this fact the question arises whether it is desirable to intensify this redistribution. 
 
However, all previous considerations are based on the assumption of a constant producer price 
of annuities. When focusing on the equilibrium outcomes in the private annuity market, one can 
identify a second cause which may hamper the effectiveness of tax incentives for life annuities. 
                                                       
27 As already cited in footnote 15, there is empirical evidence for this positive correlation.   26
It is the problem of adverse selection, which leads to inefficiently high equilibrium prices 
charged by the annuity companies. If one of the reform instruments aggravates the problem of 
adverse selection, the equilibrium price rises that in turn diminishes the stimulation of annuity 
demand.  
 
We introduced asymmetric information in the annuity market, with heterogeneous individuals, 
who differ in their life expectancy and may differ in labour income, where the assumption was 
made that survival probability and income are not negatively correlated. We found unambiguous 
effects of the following two reform instruments on adverse selection. A cut in the average 
benefit rate alleviate the adverse selection problem in the private annuity market, while an 
increase in the contribution rate aggravates it. These results suggests that for reasons of 
efficiency of the private annuity market, governments should stick to a cut in the social security 
benefits instead of an increase in the social security tax, when a reform is required to solve the 
financial difficulties of the social security system. Till now, such considerations have hardly 
entered into the political debate. However, they should be of special interest in view of the 
recent trend at the political level to stimulate the purchase of private life annuities by state 
subsidies, since only a cut in the social security benefits has the virtue to reduce the equilibrium 
price. 
 
On the other hand, we found that the effect of tax incentives for private life annuities on adverse 
selection is ambiguous. Adverse selection is shown to be reduced, if the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion does not exceed a critical value. Otherwise the effect is indeterminate and can turn 
negative for higher degrees of risk aversion. We found that this critical value is greater than one, 
when the partial-equilibrium approach is chosen, where the cut in the supply of public goods to 
finance the tax incentives has no impact on annuity demand. In case that they are financed by 
an increase in the income tax, this critical value of risk aversion turns out to be lower. Numerical 
computations were made to exemplify what degrees of risk aversion are required for a 
mitigation, aggravation, resp., of adverse selection. They provide some indication that in the first 
case adverse selection is reduced for a wide range of reasonable degrees of risk aversion, 
while in the second case one cannot rule out the possibility that the introduction of tax 
incentives exacerbates the problem of adverse selection.  
 
Altogether we can conclude that for the effectiveness of tax incentives it is crucial whether or 
not the influence of the budgetary costs of tax incentives on private old-age provision is taken 
into account: The results suggest that only if the influence is assumed to be negligible, tax 
incentives are an effective instrument to increase self-provision for retirement. However, if the 
budgetary costs are taken as a relevant influencing variable for private old-age provision, then 
we may observe little additional annuity demand: Given a constant producer price the positive   27
effect on annuity demand is smaller than in the former case and it may even turn negative for 
individuals with low life expectancy. Moreover, the producer price may rise due to an 
aggravation of adverse selection in the private annuity market which would dampen further the 
stimulation of annuity demand. 
 
 
5. Appendix  
5.1. Proofs 
Let  ij A,A 0 >  be the interior solution (18) given CRRA utility,  { } i,j 1 ,...,N ∈ , and assume that 
si ≥ sj for any type i < j. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: We show that, for any ρ > 0,  jj j iii (A s)A (A s )A 0 ∂ ∂− ∂ ∂>  and 













































wS j wS i ji R(( 1 ) R s ) (( 1 ) R s )






∂∂ τ ∂∂ τ
−= ()
11 11 11
wS j wS i ij j i (( 1 ) R s ) (( 1 ) R s )
ρρ ρρ ρρ θ π π − τ− τ − − π π − τ− τ − . (32) 
 
where  () ()
1
11 11
wS i wS j ij (1 ) R s (1 ) R s
−
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with θ > 0 for Ai, Aj > 0. Since πj > πi, 
si ≥ sj and θ > 0, (31) and (32) are positive. This, together with Lemma 5, implies that  i dQ ds 0 >  , 
S dQ d 0 τ>  .  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of the remark given in footnote 24: We calculate the effects of the social security 
benefits Si on adverse selection in analogous steps as above: By use of the definition of 
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with siwi ≡ Si, sjwj ≡ Sj. We know that πj > πi, wj ≥ wi, sj ≤ si and θ > 0. From this it follows that the 
LHS of (34) is ambiguous, if sjwj > siwi. If sjwj ≤ s iwi,  j jj iii (A S)A (A S )A ∂ ∂− ∂ ∂ is positive. 
Obviously, this holds in case of identical income, i.e. wi = wj, or starting from a situation, in which 
si = sj = 0.   Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4  
Case (i): Assume that the tax incentives for life annuities are financed by a reduction of 
government spending for public goods. We show that there exists ρ*  > 1, such that the 
difference  j j i i A ) b A ( A ) b A ( ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂  is positive for any ρ, ρ* > ρ > 0. 
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and further, by use of (36) and some simple transformations, 
 
  ()
( )() () ( )
j i
ij
11 11 1 1
ww ij ji SS ji




Q Rs ( ( 1 ) R s ) s ( ( 1 ) R s )
RR R RR R
ρρ −+ ρ ρ ρ









θ π −τ −τ − − π −τ −τ − +
ρ
+ψ +ρπ +π − +ρπ +π
 (37) 
 





1 R R R R
− ρ ρ ρ ρ π + π + ≡ ψ , ψ > 0. Further computation of (37) yields 
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Note first that (38) is positive for ρ ≤ 1, since πj > πi and si ≥ sj. But (38) is also positive for any 
ρ < 
j
i ρ  , where 
j
i ρ   represents the smallest root when (38) is set equal to zero. Thus for each pair 
of risk-types i, j a critical value 
j
i 1 ρ >   exists, which depends on πi, πj, si, sj, τw, τS, and R.  
   29
Finally, recall from Lemma 4 that annuity demand is increasing in the risk-type. Let k  be the 
index of the first type with strictly positive annuity demand and define ρ* as the smallest value of 
all 
j
i ρ  ,  i, j = k ,…N,  i < j,  i.e.  ρ* { }
j k1 k2 N
N1 i kk min , ,..., ,...,
++
− ≡ρ ρ ρ ρ    ,  ρ* > 1. It follows that (38) is 
positive for any two types i, j for any ρ < ρ*. This, together with Lemma 5, implies that 
dQ db 0 <  . 
 
Case (ii): Assume that a tax incentive for life annuities is introduced and financed by an 
increase in the income tax rate τw, such that the public budget constraint (5) remains fulfilled. 
We show that there exists ρ** < ρ*, such that the difference  ii j j b0 b0
(A b )A (A b )A
= =
∂∂ − ∂∂  is 
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Calculating the difference  ii j j b0 b0
(A b )A (A b )A
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First note, that the sign of (41) is ambiguous, since  w S 10 −τ− τ> and RA w 0 >  and for any 
j > i, πj > πi, si ≥ sj. In analogous manner as above, we define  j
i ρ

 as the smallest root when (41) 
is set equal to zero, where  j
i ρ

 is smaller than 
j
i ρ  , because the RHS of (41) is smaller than the 








i ρ  . Finally, 
we define ρ** as the smallest value of all  j
i ρ

,  i, j = k ,…N,  i < j,  i.e. 
ρ** {}
j k1 k2 N
N1 i kk min , ,..., ,...,
++
− ≡ρ ρ ρ ρ    , where k  indicates the index of the first type with strictly 
positive annuity demand. It follows that (41) is positive for any two types i, j for any ρ < ρ**, 









<   for any ρ < ρ**. 
  Q.E.D.   30
5.2. The effects of the introduction of a tax incentive on adverse selection: Numerical 
illustration of Proposition 4 for two risk-types i = 1,2  
 
Table 1: Scenario 1: "Generous" social security system  
b = 0, τw = 0.3, τS = 0.2, w2 = 150, s2 = 0.24 π2 = 0.8, γ2 = 1 − γ1 
  ρ = 2  ρ = 3  ρ = 4  ρ = 5  ρ = 8  ρ =16 
1a) w1 = 100, s1 = 0.28, π1 = 0.2, γ1 = 0.2        
  i Q    0.8 0.784  0.768  0.760 0.747 0.736 
 A 1  0  2.48  4.98  6.50 8.82  10.78 
 A 2   21.67 22.09 22.39 22.51 22.61 22.64 
  MA1/Mb Case  (i) 













  MA2/Mb   Case (i) 













  MA1/Mb/A1 − MA2/Mb/A2 Case  (i) 













1b) w1 = 100, s1 = 0.28, π1 = 0.4, γ1 = 0.2             
  i Q    0.789 0.769 0.764 0.762 0.757 0.754 
 A 1   5.03 7.54 8.80 9.58 10.69 11.63 
 A 2   22.37 22.48 22.48 22.47 22.42 22.36 
  MA1/Mb Case  (i) 













  MA2/Mb   Case (i) 













  MA1/Mb/A1 − MA2/Mb/A2 Case  (i) 













1c) w1 = 100, s1 = 0.28, π1 = 0.2, γ1 = 0.4        
  i Q    0.8 0.755  0.720  0.701 0.675 0.655 
 A 1  0  2.77  5.45  7.06 9.46  11.46 
 A 2   21.67 22.86 23.58 23.84 24.03 24.01 
  MA1/Mb Case  (i) 













  MA2/Mb   Case (i) 













  MA1/Mb/A1 − MA2/Mb/A2 Case  (i) 













1d) w1 = 100, s1 = 0.26, π1 = 0.2, γ1 = 0.2        
  i Q    0.8 0.782  0.766  0.756 0.743 0.732 
 A 1  0  2.50  5.00  6.53 8.86  10.81 
 A 2   21.67 20.45 20.75 20.88 20.98 20.98 
  MA1/Mb Case  (i) 













  MA2/Mb   Case (i) 













  MA1/Mb/A1 − MA2/Mb/A2 Case  (i) 













1e) w1 = 150, s1 = 0.24, π1 = 0.2, γ1 = 0.2        
  i Q    0.792 0.750 0.732 0.721 0.705 0.693 
 A 1  1.21  8.27  11.92  14.14 17.51 20.35 
 A 2   21.93 22.99 23.27 23.37 23.41 23.35 
  MA1/Mb Case  (i) 













  MA2/Mb   Case (i) 













  MA1/Mb/A1 − MA2/Mb/A2 Case  (i) 
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Table 2: Scenario 2: "Moderate" social security system 
b = 0, τw = 0.3, τS = 0.1, w2 = 150, s2 = 0.14 π2 = 0.8, γ2 = 1 − γ1 
  ρ = 2  ρ = 3  ρ = 4  ρ = 6  ρ = 7  ρ =16 
2a) w1 = 100, s1 = 0.18, π1 = 0.2, γ1 = 0.2        
  i Q    0.768 0.752 0.744 0.737 0.734 0.727 
 A 1  9.07  13.87  16.40  19.01 19.77 22.36 
 A 2  39.74  40.09  40.18  40.22 40.21 40.17 
  MA1/Mb Case  (i) 













  MA2/Mb   Case (i) 













  MA1/Mb/A1 − MA2/Mb/A2 Case  (i) 













2b) w1 = 100, s1 = 0.18, π1 = 0.4, γ1 = 0.2           
  i Q    0.763 0.758 0.755 0.752 0.751 0.749 
 A 1   16.39 18.91 20.19 21.47 21.83 23.07 
 A 2   39.96 39.88 39.81 39.73 39.70 39.59 
  MA1/Mb Case  (i) 













  MA2/Mb   Case (i) 













  MA1/Mb/A1 − MA2/Mb/A2 Case  (i) 













2c) w1 = 100, s1 = 0.18, π1 = 0.2, γ1 = 0.4          
  i Q    0.719 0.687 0.671 0.656 0.652 0.638 
 A 1   9.90 14.96 17.60 20.30 21.08 23.73 
 A 2   42.06 42.79 42.93 42.92 42.88 42.68 
  MA1/Mb Case  (i) 













  MA2/Mb   Case (i) 













  MA1/Mb/A1 − MA2/Mb/A2 Case  (i) 













2d) w1 = 100, s1 = 0.16, π1 = 0.2, γ1 = 0.2         
  i Q    0.763 0.748 0.740 0.733 0.731 0.723 
 A 1   10.59 15.29 17.77 20.33 21.07 23.61 
 A 2   39.96 40.25 40.32 40.33 40.32 40.46 
  MA1/Mb Case  (i) 













  MA2/Mb   Case (i) 













  MA1/Mb/A1 − MA2/Mb/A2 Case  (i) 













2e) w1 = 150, s1 = 0.14, π1 = 0.2, γ1 = 0.2         
  i Q    0.739 0.719 0.710 0.700 0.697 0.687 
 A 1   18.66 25.68 29.38 33.19 34.30 38.08 
 A 2   41.07 41.39 41.44 41.40 41.38 41.24 
  MA1/Mb Case  (i) 













  MA2/Mb   Case (i) 













  MA1/Mb/A1 − MA2/Mb/A2 Case  (i) 
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